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COMMENTARY ON "THE POSSIBILITY OF GOD" 
James Patrick Downey 
Clement Dore has offered a demonstration that God is possible. This is important because 
the Ontological Argument shows that if God is possible, it is necessarily true that God 
exists. Dore's demonstration parallels Descartes's Meditation V argument: (roughly) God 
by definition has all perfections; but (Dore proposes) possible existence is a perfection; 
therefore, God is possible. However, Leibniz recognized that Descartes's argument is 
incomplete, omitting proof that the concept of God is consistent. Dore's demonstration 
fails for just this reason. Dore's defense misses this objection. If the concept of God is 
consistent, that directly establishes that God is possible, making assumptions about per-
fections irrelevant. 
Leibniz wrote that 
... certain philosophers, ancient and modem, have constructed a 
demonstration of God that is extremely imperfect. It must be, they say, 
that I have an idea of God, or of a perfect being, since I think of him 
and we cannot think without having ideas; now the idea of this being 
includes all perfections and since existence is one of these perfections 
it follows that he exists. But I reply, inasmuch as we often think of 
impossible chimeras, for example of the highest degree of swiftness, 
of the greatest number, of the meeting of the conchoid with its base or 
determinant, such reasoning is not sufficient. It is therefore in this sense 
that we can say that there are true and false ideas according as the thing 
which is in question is possible or not. And it is when he is assured of 
the possibility of a thing, that one can boast of having an idea of it. 
Therefore, the aforesaid argument proves that God exists, if he is pos-
sible. This is in fact an excellent privilege of the divine nature, to have 
need only of a possibility or an essence in order to actually exist ... I 
Leibniz attempted to supplement the ontological argument with a demonstration 
that God is possible. Unfortunately, it depends upon questionable suppositions 
concerning the concept of a perfection, and upon the questionable assumption 
that if a concept is not analytically inconsistent it follows that it is not inconsistent. 
However, Leibniz did recognize that the fundamental issue in the ontological 
argument is the consistency of the concept of God, which is the question of the 
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possibility of God's existence. The ontological argument shows that necessarily 
if God is possible, then God exists, but the proof that God is possible is lacking. 
Recently, Clement Dore has offered a demonstration that God is possible. 2 
Dore's proof is modeled after Descartes's Meditation V argument. Here is the 
demonstration, which Dore calls A2: 
So, 
(l) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being. 
(2) The concept of logical possibility is the concept of a perfection 
relative to God. 
(3) the concept of God stands to the concept of logical possibility as, 
e.g., the concept of a square stands to the concept of a figure which 
has more sides than three, i.e., it is a conceptual truth that God is 
logically possible. 
Hence, 
(4) God really is a logically possible being. (p. 304) 
(1) is usually held to be true by definition. (2) is supposed to parallel Descartes's 
premise that existence is a perfection. Accordingly, (2) might be subjected to 
criticisms similar to the traditional ones against Descartes. Some might argue 
that possible existence is not a genuine predicate, or perhaps not a perfection, 
a property that adds to the greatness of a thing.3 
However, even if (2) could be adequately defended, A2 still would not prove 
that God is possible. It suffers from the same defect Leibniz's remarks find in 
Descartes's demonstration. 
Descartes's thought is that the concept of God logically includes the property 
of existence, just as the concept of a mountain logically includes the property 
of being conjoined with a valley-more accurately, just as the concept of an 
upward slope logically includes the property of being conjoined with a downward 
slope-Dr, just as the concept of a triangle logically includes the property of 
having three angles equal to two right angles. 
However, that a property P is logically included in a concept C does not entail 
that C is consistent, or such that it is logically possible that there exists an object 
of C. It is true that the concept of the greatest number logically includes the 
property of being greater than two, but it is not logically possible that the greatest 
number exists. The concept of the greatest number is not consistent. 
But, suppose the property in question is possible existence. If possible existence 
is logically included in the concept of an individual a, does this not establish 
that it is a conceptual truth that a is possible? No, for consider the concept of 
Arthur, the supremely perfect being that is F and not-F for some property F. If 
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possible existence is a perfection, then it is logically included in the concept of 
Al1hur, since that concept includes all perfections. Nevertheless, it does not 
follow that it is a conceptual truth that Arthur is possible. That Arthur is possible 
cannot be any sort of truth. Since the concept of Arthur is not consistent there 
can be no such being. 
Leibniz points out that determining the consistency of the concept of God is 
logically distinct from determining that it necessarily includes some property, 
and he argues that Descartes's demonstration omits proof that the concept of 
God is consistent. 
Since A2 differs from Descartes's demonstration only in that it substitutes the 
property of possible existence for the property of existence, even if it demonstrates 
that possible existence is logically included in the concept of God it omits proof 
that the concept of God is consistent. Therefore, A2 does not prove that it is 
logically possible that God exists.4 
Dore's defense focuses on establishing that the conclusion of A2 is undeniably 
that God is really possible, rather than merely (the conditional claim Dore calls 
<1» that if God exists then he is possible. I would say that if the concept of God 
is consistent, then the conclusion that God is really possible is true. However, 
the proof of the antecedent is missing. And, nothing in Dore's line of defense 
helps prove that the concept of God is consistent. 
Dore's first strategy adds the assumption that" ... it is a conceptual truth 
that God is possible entails the claim that it is because of the concept of possibility 
and the concept of God (and not some other being) that the sentence 'God is 
possible' expresses a truth.", which apparently is to follow from the assumption 
that ". . . it is the mark of a conceptual truth-expressing sentence that its being 
truth-expressing is explicable in terms of its expressing precisely the concepts 
which it expresses." (p. 305) 
However, even if these assumed entailments were correct, they would offer 
no refutation of the Leibnizian objection to A2. Whether or not the proposition 
that God is possible entails these things if it is a conceptual truth does not bear 
on the objection that A2 does not establish that it is a conceptual truth since A2 
does not demonstrate the consistency of the concept. 
Moreover, emphasizing that A2 determines possible existence to be logically 
included in the concept of God precisely by virtue of the concept of God's 
induding all perfections and the concept ofiogical possibility's being the concept 
of a perfection, rather than by virtue of any other assumption something or any 
other concepts, is of no help against the Leibnizian objection. For, the same can 
be said with respect to our determination that possible existence is logically 
induded in the concept of Arthur. It gets included precisely because the concept 
of Arthur includes all perfections and the concept of logical possibility is the 
concept of a perfection, and not because of any other assumptions. 5 
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Dore's second strategy, which argues that (4), 'God is really a logically 
possible being', is not analytic, is of no help against Leibniz's objection, either. 
Whether (4) would be an analytic or a synthetic truth is beside the point of the 
Leibnizian objection that A2 does not establish (4)'s truth since it does not 
establish that the concept of God is consistent. 
I conclude that A2 has not been defended against Leibniz's objection to 
Descartes, and I do not see how it can be. Dore, himself, is to be commended 
for advancing a demonstration that God is possible. 6 Any such attempt is a step 
forward in a central challenge for rational theism, and merits the close attention 
of all concerned with these matters. 7 
University of Virginia 
NOTES 
1. Leibniz, G., Discourse On Metaphysics, Open Court Publishing Company, reprint edition, 1973, 
pp. 40-41. 
2. Dore, Clement, "The Possibility of God," Faith And Philosophy, Vol. 1, no. 3, July 1984. All 
page references are to this text. 
3. Dore speaks of the concept of logical possibility as the concept of a perfection relative to God. 
The alleged perfection, itself, [ take to be a certain property, being logically possible, which for 
convenience I shall refer to as the property of possible existence. 
4. Of course, if the concept of God is consistent (broadly logically consistent, to employ the 
contemporary term for the distinction from mere formal consistency), that directly establishes that 
God is possible, making the assumption that possible existence is a perfection, and indeed the whole 
procedure of A2 , superfluous. 
5. Nor would Dore's treatment of logical truths in connection with his 'possible super-centaur' 
case reveal any differences between the concepts of God and Arthur that might save A2 . 'Arthur' 
is indeed similar to 'possible super-centaur' in that both concepts are artificially constructed with 
possibility built in. Dore might suggest, for this and other reasons, that both concepts lead only to 
the trivial logical truth that if any such things exist they are possible. It is certainly necessarily true 
of any concept that if its object exists its object is possible. However, artificially constructed and 
leading to logical truths or not, it is the case that if these concepts are consistent their objects 
necessarily exist, and that unless they are consistent their objects cannot possibly exist. The same 
holds for the concept of God in the ontological argument. 'Arthur' is explicitly inconsistent. 'Possible 
super-centaur', as well as other Gaunilo-type concepts, are not consistent since their objects cannot 
be necessary beings. Whether the concept of God is consistent is not clear. (l take up the difficulties 
which necessity in the concept of God creates for both the traditional Gaunilo response to Anselm 
and for a modem version of Gaunilo directed at modal ontological arguments, in my paper "A 
Primordial Reply To Modern Gaunilo's," Religious Studies, vol. 22, no. I, March 1986.) 
6. Dore has also offered a different demonstration of God's possibility in his book Theism. [t seems 
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not more successful than A2, and offers no help for A2 against Le:ibniz. 
7. I am grateful to James Cargile for reading earlier drafts of this paper and making valuable 
suggestions. 
